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CAN CONGRESS REGULATE FIREARMS?:
PRINTZ v. UNITED STATES AND THE INTERSECTION OF
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, THE TENTH AMENDMENT, AND
THE SECOND AMENDMENT 1
The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Printz v. United States restricted
congressional legislative authority by striking down the interim provisions of the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act. The decision followed United States v.
Lopez, in which the Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act. In both
cases, the Court restricted the congressional Commerce Power and renewed the
strength of the Tenth Amendment in protecting states' rights from federal intrusion.
Because both cases involved statutes regulating firearms, however, they also
raised important questions regarding the Second Amendment. Following the Lopez
decision, some commentators argued that both the Tenth and Second Amendments
restrict Congress'ability to regulate firearms. Now, after Printz, commentators are
likely to argue again that the Court has placed a further significant restriction on
federal firearms regulation.
This Note argues that, while Printz raised important questions about the
Commerce Power, the Tenth Amendment, and the Second Amendment, Congress'
authority to regulate firearms remains substantially intact. The Note demonstrates
this by examining the Printz case in the context of the Court's developing Tenth
Amendment/Commerce Clause jurisprudence and its longstanding Second
Amendment jurisprudence. The Note also proposes that the Supreme Court should
reaffirm clearly its "states' rights" interpretation of the Second Amendment to
settle the debate over Congress' authority to regulate firearms.
With its decision in Printz v. United States,2 the United States Supreme Court
continued to pare back congressional lawmaking authority under the Commerce
Clause and to affirm the Tenth Amendment as a renewed force in the constitutional
law of the United States. The Court's decision in Printz stands primarily as an
extension of the holding in New York v. United States,3 which established that
Congress cannot issue direct mandates to state governments to enact laws. The
Printz holding prevents the federal government from circumventing the New York
This Note benefited from the thoughtful criticism of Professor Kathryn R. Urbonya of
the William and Mary School of Law, and the helpful guidance of Ms. Colleen N. Kotyk,
Student Note Editor of the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal in 1997-1998.
2 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
3 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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decision by co-opting state and local officials to enforce federal laws.' The limitation
imposed by Printz came in the wake of United States v. Lopez,5 another important
decision restricting congressional legislative authority under the Commerce Clause.
Although Lopez and Printz broadly apply to a range of Commerce Clause and Tenth
Amendment questions, the area of federal law with which both cases dealt directly
was the Gun Control Act of 1968.6 With Lopez, the Court struck down the Gun Free
School Zones Act,7 and with Printz, it struck down the interim provisions of the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act ("Brady Act").8 Lopez drew considerable
commentary as potentially heralding a Supreme Court affirmation that Congress
fundamentally was restricted in its ability to regulate firearms due to restrictions on
the commerce power and to the Second Amendment as well. 9 Printz is certain to
draw similar attention and, in conjunction with Lopez, to be heralded as a "sea
change" in the Court's jurisprudence on firearms regulation.0
This Note argues that no such sea change has taken place. Printz and Lopez do
raise some serious questions about Congress' power to regulate firearms, both in
terms of Congress' commerce authority vis-a-vis the newly muscular Tenth
Amendment, and in terms of what rights the Second Amendment actually guarantees.
Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in Printz specifically invoked the spectre of the
latter." An analysis of Printz and Lopez, however, reveals not only that Congress'
authority to regulate firearms remains intact, but that the established jurisprudence
of the federal judiciary continues to stand.
Part I of this Note examines the Printz and Lopez opinions with particular focus
on the firearms statutes at issue in each. Part II examines the Commerce Clause and
Tenth Amendment implications of firearms regulation and concludes with an
appraisal of the way in which the Lopez and Printz opinions have altered Congress'
power to regulate firearms in the stream of commerce. Part III explores four Second
Amendment issues in controversy: (1) the debate over the proper understanding of
4 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2384.
' 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
6 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-30 (1994).
18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994). See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1994). See Printz, 505 U.S. at 2368, 2384.
9 See infra note 83 (relaying reactions to Lopez "individual rights" proponents).
'o See, e.g., Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of Criminal Statutes-
Balancing Acts, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 1, 62 (1997) ("[C]onstitutional law heavyweights
like Texas' Sanford Levinson, writing in the YALE LAW JOURNAL, and Duke's William Van
Alstyne, writing in his school's law review, [are] taking arguments seriously that previously
had been regarded as constitutional curiosities.... This sea change in scholarly attitude
makes it plausible to analogize the right to keep and bear arms to the right to free
expression ..... (citations omitted)); see also infra note 107 (citing pro-gun reactions to the
Printz decision).
" See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2385 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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the Second Amendment, particularly the "states' rights" view of the Second
Amendment versus the "individual rights" view; (2) the jurisprudential construction
of the Second Amendment to date; (3) the limited way in which Printz and Lopez
bear upon the Second Amendment; and (4) the need for a modem statement by the
Supreme Court as to the scope and proper understanding of the Second Amendment.
Part IV reemphasizes that Congress' authority to regulate firearms remains
substantially intact, even though the Lopez and Printz decisions have affected that
authority considerably.
I. PRINTZ, LOPEZ, AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF FIREARMS
The holdings in Printz and Lopez have little in common except the questions
raised in each about the proper extent of congressional authority to regulate firearms
pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Printz requires particular examination because
of its recent vintage and the consequent paucity of commentary on it to date.
A. Printz v. United States
In Printz, local sheriffs in Arizona and Montana challenged the constitutionality
of the interim provisions of the Brady Act. 2 The Brady Act required the United
States Attorney General to establish a national, instant system for checking the
backgrounds of prospective handgun buyers. 3 The Brady Act also required that the
Attorney General command the chief law enforcement officers ("CLEOs") of each
local jurisdiction in the country to conduct such background checks and related tasks
until such time as the national system was to be put into place. 4 Sheriffs Printz and
Mack were CLEOs of counties in Montana and Arizona. They filed separate actions
challenging the constitutionality of the interim provision. In each case, the district
court held that the background check provision was unconstitutional, but concluded
that it was severable from the remainder of the Brady Act, 5 effectively leaving a
voluntary background check system in place until the national system should become
operative. Upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit considered the two cases together and
reversed to uphold the interim provisions as constitutional. 6 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed the holding of the Ninth Circuit, agreeing with the
district courts that the interim provisions of the Brady Act were unconstitutional. 7
12 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2369.
'3 See 18 U.S.C. 922(s) (1994).
14 See id.
'" See Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1519 (D. Mont. 1994); Mack v. United
States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1382-83 (D. Ariz. 1994).
16 See Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995).
'" See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2384.
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Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia found the interim provisions
unconstitutional based on three principal grounds. He noted that no constitutional
provision directly speaks to the power of Congress to compel state officers to execute
federal laws." Therefore, for Justice Scalia, the question of whether the interim
provisions were constitutional required consideration of the Framers' intent and of
historical practice, the Constitution's structure, and the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence. 9 Justice Scalia then set forth the majority's reasoning in concluding
that Congress' early enactments revealed no such authority to have been assumed by
the federal government.2" The majority also concluded that neither the Constitution's
structure2' nor the Court's established jurisprudence2 2 supported such a proposition.
As for the Constitution's structure, the majority determined that the Constitution
reveals the principle of "dual sovereignty," wherein both the state and federal
governments govern citizens.' Although the states surrendered many of their powers
to the newly created federal government when they ratified the Constitution, they
retained what the Court termed a "residuary and inviolable sovereignty" reflected
throughout the Constitution.24 This residual sovereignty forbade the federal
government from asserting control over state officers qua state officers.25 Moreover,
federal co-option of state officers also would tend to disrupt the balance of powers
within the federal government itself.26 The Brady Act effectively transferred the
President's responsibility to administer a law enacted by Congress to the CLEOs of
the fifty states, who were then left to implement the program "without meaningful
Presidential control. 27 Such a result, reasoned the Court, "shatter[s]" the unity of the
federal executive: Congress could reduce unconstitutionally the President's power
if the Constitution permitted Congress to require state officers to execute federal
laws.2' Thus, when a law violates the principle of dual sovereignty it cannot be said
to be valid as a law "necessary and proper" for the execution of Congress' Commerce
Clause power to regulate, inter alia, handgun sales.29
In reviewing its jurisprudential treatment of the dual sovereignty principle, the
majority in Printz took particular note of the Court's recent holding that the federal
government may not compel the states to enact or administer a federal regulatory
'8 See id. at 2370.
'9 See id. at 2369.
20 See id. at 2370-71.
21 See id. at 2376-79.
22 See id. at 2379-83.
23 See id at 2376.
24 Id. at 2376-77.
2 See id.
26 See id. at 2378.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 See id. at 2378-79.
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program.3" The Printz majority's jurisprudential argument focused aimost solely on
New York v. United States,3 and stated that the New York majority's concern with
mandates issued to state legislatures did not distinguish it from the mandates issued
directly to state officers at issue in Printz, which the federal government had argued
merely were "ministerial" and, therefore, not violative of the ruling in New York.32
Thus, on this basis, as well as that of dual sovereignty, Printz stands as another
important pronouncement in the Supreme Court's recent series of holdings tending
to reinvigorate the Tenth Amendment.33
Both Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas wrote concurring opinions, neither
of which was joined by any other justice.34 Justice O'Connor emphasized that the
Court's holding did not spell out the end of The Brady Act's objective of better
regulating the sale of handguns, and that once the national background check system
came online, nothing would have been removed from the Brady Act." Justice
O'Connor also emphasized that, even though Congress lawfully could not compel
state officers to enforce the interim provisions of the Brady Act, Congress could
amend the Act to provide for continuation of the interim provisions on a strictly
contractual basis with the states.36 Thus, gun control advocates may derive a certain
measure of hope from Justice O'Connor's concurrence: there presently appears to be
a majority of justices on the Court who are unwilling to question whether Congress
has the general authority, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, to regulate firearms as
articles of commerce.
Conversely, Justice Thomas's concurrence offered inspiration, though perhaps
not hope, to opponents of firearms regulation. Justice Thomas openly questioned,
even if the Court had found that the interim provisions of the Brady Act did not
violate the Tenth Amendment, whether Congress would have constitutional authority
to regulate firearms.37 After making reference to his concurring opinion in Lopez, in
which he advocated a strict and somewhat archaic understanding of the term
"commerce" that effectively would deny Congress the authority to regulate anything
but the shipment of goods across state lines,38 Justice Thomas discussed what he
perceived to be an important Second Amendment question in Printz:
30 See id. at 2380 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)).
31 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
32 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2382.
31 See id passim; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1997); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Gun Free School Zones Act exceeded
Congress' Commerce Clause authority and therefore violated the Tenth Amendment).
34 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2385-86 (O'Connor & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
31 See id. at 2385 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
36 See id.
37 See id. at 2385-86 (Thomas, J., concurring).
38 See Lopez, 514 U.S at 584-602 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Even if we construe Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce
to encompass those intrastate transactions that "substantially affect"
interstate commerce, I question whether Congress can regulate the
particular transactions at issue here.... The Second Amendment...
appears to contain an express limitation on the government's
authority.... If... the Second Amendment is read to confer a personal
right to "keep and bear arms," a colorable argument exists that the Federal
Government's regulatory scheme, at least as it pertains to the purely
intrastate sale or possession of firearms, runs afoul of that Amendment's
protections.39
Justice Thomas's opinion indicated strongly that he viewed the Second Amendment
as conferring a personal right to bear arms, and that he interpreted the Constitution
to mean that the regulation of firearms was not one of the "enumerated, hence
limited, powers" granted to the federal government.4'
In his Printz concurrence, Justice Thomas interpreted United States v. Miller,
41
the Court's last real pronouncement on the meaning of the Second Amendment, very
narrowly to mean only that the Second Amendment does not protect a citizen's right
to possess a sawed-off shotgun because that weapon had not, in the language of
Miller, been shown to be "ordinary military equipment" that could "contribute to the
common defense. '42 He supported his individual rights view of the Second
Amendment by briefly reviewing recent scholarship advocating that theory.43
Moreover, Justice Thomas issued what amounted to a plea for the Court to revisit the
issue of what right or rights the Second Amendment actually guarantees."'
It is noteworthy that no otherjustice joined Justice Thomas's concurring opinion.
Not even Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion and, of all the justices on
the Court, the one ideologically closest to Justice Thomas, was willing to support the
individual rights view propounded in the concurrence. Also worth noting is the
failure of any justice to join Justice Thomas in calling for the Court to revisit the
issue of the Second Amendment's meaning.
45
'9 Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2385-86 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
40 Id. at 2385.
41 307 U.S. at 174 (1939).
42 Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2386 n.1 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at
178).
41 See id at 2386 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring).
4 See id. at 2386 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Perhaps, at some future date, this Court will
have the opportunity to determine whether Justice Story was correct when he wrote that the
right to bear arms 'has justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a
republic."' (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1890,
at 746 (1833))).
41 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term Foreword. Implementing
[Vol. 7:2
CAN CONGRESS REGULATE FIREARMS?
Justice Thomas's concurring opinion stands in sharp contrast to his concurrence
in Lopez,46 another case dealing with Congress' Commerce Clause authority to
regulate firearms.47 Because of the extent to which partisans in the debate over
federal firearms regulation have sought to portray Lopez as a limitation on the power
of the federal government to regulate the flow of firearms in commerce,4" Lopez
deserves careful review.
B. United States v. Lopez
The facts of Lopez dealt with the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990,"9 which
forbade "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm . . . at a place that [he]
knows... is a school zone.""0 In Lopez, school officials caught Alfonso Lopez, Jr.,
a twelfth grade student in San Antonio, Texas, carrying a concealed handgun at
school.5 Lopez was charged under the Gun Free School Zones Act and, at trial,
made a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the Act was an
unconstitutional exercise of Congress' commerce power. The district court denied
his motion and upheld the statute.52 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding
that in light of what it characterized as insufficient congressional findings and
legislative history, the Gun Free School Zones Act was an invalid ultra vires statute
that the commerce power did not support.53 The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth
Circuit's decision, holding that the Act indeed did exceed Congress' Commerce
Clause authority.54
In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that the mere
possession of a gun in a school zone, which the Act very narrowly addressed, was in
no sense an "economic activity" that might have a "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce.5 Rather, the statute in question was "a criminal statute that by its terms
the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 108-09 & n.313 (1997) (citing Justice Thomas's
concurring opinion in Printz as an example of"[a] ... category of potentially extraordinary
[case law] [that] probably reflects nothing more than the views, interests, or agendas of
justices who happen to sit on the Court at a particular time," wherein "Justices may press...
to persuade their colleagues to reconsider seemingly settled issues" (citing Printz, 117 S. Ct.
at 2386 & nn.1-2)).
46 See infra notes 64, 167 and accompanying text.
47 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun Free School
Zones Act for exceeding the authority of the Congressional Commerce Clause).
48 See infra note 83 (citing reactions to Lopez by pro-gun individual rights theorists).
41 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994).
50 Id. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994).
5' See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
52 See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993).
13 See id. at 1367-68.
4 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
5sId. at*560-61.
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[had] nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms. [The Gun Free School Zones Act was] not an
essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity... "56 As such, no nexus
between the statute and interstate commerce was evident "to the naked eye."57
Moreover, the statute did not contain ajurisdictional element that would ensure,
through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearms possession in question had the
requisite nexus with interstate commerce." Under the specific facts of Lopez, there
was no indication that the student had moved recently in interstate commerce;
whether the firearm in question had done so was irrelevant, because the language of
the statute focused on the individual in possession of the weapon, not on the firearm
itself. 9 Therefore, the Court ruled "[t]o uphold the government's contentions" that
the Gun Free School Zones Act is justified because firearms possession in a local
school zone indeed does substantially affect interstate commerce would require the
Court "to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the
sort retained by the states."6 °
In other words, in regulating mere firearms possession, Congress simply went too
far; only the states hold such authority. Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion
in Lopez which Justice O'Connorjoined.6 Although Justice Kennedy never directly
addressed the issue of congressional authority to regulate firearms, he did suggest that
gun control fundamentally was a state prerogative, subject to specific instances in
which the Constitution authorizes Congress to regulate firearms under the commerce
power. 2 Justice Kennedy's reasoning, although specifically aimed at interpreting the
56 Id. at 561 (citation omitted).
" Id. at 563.
58 See id. at 561.
9 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (making it unlawful for "any individual knowingly to
possess a firearm at a place [he] knows.., is a school zone" (emphasis added)).
60 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
61 See id. at 568-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
62 See id. at 583.
The statute now before us forecloses the States from experimenting and exer-
cising their own judgment in an area to which States lay claim by right of
history and expertise .... The tendency of this statute [is] to displace State
regulation in areas of traditional State concern .... Absent a stronger connection
or identification with commercial concerns that are central to the Commerce
Clause, that interference contradicts the federal balance the Framers designed
and that this Court is obliged to enforce.
Id. (emphasis added). The apparent echo of the "traditional areas of State regulation" holding
from National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), is striking. Whether this
wording implies that Justices Kennedy and O'Connor would advocate some form of rejection
or modification of the Court's holding in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), which overruled National League of Cities, is an intriguing
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Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment, suggests that he may adhere to the
states' rights view of the Second Amendment. 3
Justice Thomas also wrote a concurring opinion, which no other justice joined.'
This concurrence stands somewhat at odds with his concurrence in Printz,65 in that
the Lopez concurrence suggests that the Constitution does not prohibit firearms
regulation, at least not for the states.66 Insofar as the two concurring opinions are at
odds, Justice Thomas's concurrence in Printz might be taken as more indicative of
his current views by virtue of the case's recency. If true, however, it would appear
that Justice Thomas's advocacy of state authority over matters "traditionally" left to
state regulation is not now as firm as it was in 1995.
II. CONGRESS AUTHORITY TO REGULATE FIREARMS IN COMMERCE
A. The Brave New World of Lopez
In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court laid out a tripartite schema for
commercial activities that Congress may regulate under its Commerce Clause
authority.67 This schema allows Congress to regulate: (1) the channels of interstate
commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and (3) intrastate
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.68 The court decided Lopez
question. See Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARv. L. REv. 13, 43-44 (1995)
(noting that Justice Kennedy's proposal in Lopez, like the "traditional government functions"
test of National League of Cities, may be "doomed to failure because it is unworkable and
unnecessary"). The majority opinion echoed Justice Kennedy's reasoning somewhat. See
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
63 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. For further discussion of the states' rights view of the
Second Amendment, see infra text accompanying notes 111-15.
See id. at 584-602 (Thomas, J., concurring).
65 See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2385-86 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(noting that the Second Amendment appears to contain an express limitation on the
government's authority to regulate firearms).
66 See id. at 584.
[I]t seems to me that the power to regulate "commerce" can by no means en-
compass authority over mere gun possession .... Our Constitution quite
properly leaves such matters to the individual States, notwithstanding [their]
effects on interstate commerce. Any interpretation of the Commerce Clause that
even suggests that Congress could regulate such matters is in need of
reexamination.
Id at 585 (emphasis added). Whether Justice Thomas actually would reject the view of many
individual rights theorists that the Second Amendment should be considered incorporated
against the States via the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection clause is unclear from
this concurrence.
67 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
68 See id. at 558; see also Fried, supra note 62, at 39-40.
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under the third category, and determined that the possession of a firearm within 1,000
feet of a school-an intrastate activity-did not "substantially affect" interstate
commerce and was not properly construable as a "commercial activity."69 The
majority observed that there were no congressional findings to support the judgment
that gun possession in a school zone substantially affected interstate commerce." The
Court disagreed with that judgment and, thus, found no jurisdictional element to
establish Congress' right to legislate in this area.7 For this reason, the Court in
Lopez struck down the Gun Free School Zones Act.
Only in the category of intrastate activities having a substantial effect upon
interstate commerce did the Court advocate consideration of criteria using degree
rather than kind; that is, an intrastate activity's effect on commerce must be
"substantial" to warrant congressional legislation, in contrast to "channels" and
"instrumentalities" of interstate commerce which Congress may regulate as such.72
Thus, as applied to guns, Congress has the authority to continue to regulate firearms
as instrumentalities of interstate commerce, provided that the firearms in question
actually move across state lines. Congress, likewise, may regulate intrastate
trafficking in firearms so long as there is some showing, preferably in the legislative
record, that the intrastate trade in firearms has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.73 Congressional regulation of mere "possession" of a firearm likely is per
se unconstitutional in the wake of Lopez.74
The key principle that Lopez represents in demarcating the bounds of
congressional legislative authority under the Commerce Clause is that Congress'
powers are not all-encompassing or plenary; rather, they are enumerated and limited.
Consequently, the rationales offered for congressional regulation on any subject must
recognize some bounds on federal power.75 In this respect, Lopez arguably limits
only the type of arguments advanced by Congress for regulation under the Commerce
Clause, not Congress' actual capacity to legislate on a broad range of matters,76
though this is not to say that Congress' legislative authority effectively is unlimited.
69 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-63.
70 See id. at 562-63.
1" See id at 567. Because of the § 922(q) prohibition of gun possession, rather than
trafficking, near schools, there was no reason to question whether the firearm itself had
moved in interstate commerce. See supra note 59 and accompanying text; Deborah Jones
Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 694-700 (1995).
72 See Merritt, supra note 71, at 694-700.
73 See id. at 689.
4 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62; see also Merritt, supra note 71, at 700-01 ("[While]
Lopez did not challenge the statute under the Second Amendment,. . . [tihe statute's focus
on gun possession... may have affected the Court's decision.").
75 See Merritt, supra note 71, at 684-85.
76 See id at 689.
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In fact, if any of the following four factors are present, Congress likely will find it
difficult to regulate an intrastate activity:
(1) the activity is non-commercial;
(2) the statute in question lacks a jurisdictional element requiring a
case-by-case determination of the interstate commercial nexus;
(3) there is a lack or absence of congressional findings supporting its
claim of substantial effect upon interstate commerce; or
(4) the justifications offered for the claimed connection with interstate
commerce are so broad that they impose no limit on federal power.77
Thus, the "substantial effect" analysis is qualitative rather than quantitative,
amounting to a "toughened rational basis" standard of review for this type of
congressional regulation.78 Indeed, the Chief Justice stated in the majority opinion
that "[t]hese are not precise formulations, and in the nature of things they cannot
be."
79
The majority in Lopez allowed that Congress would be able to continue
regulating many areas of governmental activity traditionally reserved to the
states-such as education-thereby undercutting any suggestion that the Commerce
Clause now preserves specific enclaves of state power.8" Whether it is true that "[t]he
limit embraced by Lopez is more likely to constrain the rationales offered for
congressional action than the ends of that action"'" remains to be seen. However, at
least some of the language in Printz appears to point in that direction. 2
Although the Court in Lopez did not address directly the question of
congressional power to regulate firearms, the fact that the Court struck down the Gun
" See id. at 685.
78 See id. at 677.
79 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
80 See id. at 565. Merritt suggests that "[i]f Congress... abide[s] by this limit in future
cases, the Court may not care whether the states retain exclusive control over any pockets of
regulatory authority. Once Congress has finished counting its enumerated powers, it may
have invaded every enclave of State regulation." Merritt, supra note 71, at 690. While this
view may be somewhat extreme, nothing in the Lopez opinion seems to contradict it.
81 Merritt, supra note 71, at 690.
82 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2385 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court's
decision in Printz did not "spell the end of the objectives of the Brady Act," and implying
that Congress had due authority to regulate firearms transactions in the way that it did in the
Brady Act); see also id. at 2379 (Scalia, J.) ("'[T]he Commerce Clause . . . authorizes
Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate
State governments' regulation of interstate commerce."' (quoting New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992))). By incorporating language from a prominent pre-Lopez decision,
Justice Scalia implied, more indirectly than did Justice O'Connor in her concurrence, that
Congress' effective authority to regulate interstate commerce remains broad.
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Free School Zones Act has caused many opponents of firearms regulation to claim
that the Lopez holding supports the idea that every individual has a right to bear
arms. 3 Lopez did not overrule previous Commerce Clause jurisprudence regarding
firearms regulation, however, which leads to the conclusion that neither the
Commerce Clause nor the Tenth Amendment provide a defense to individuals
running afoul of federal firearms regulations." Indeed, the Lopez decision suggests
that congressional action of the type used in the Brady Act would be constitutional
under the Commerce Clause. 5
In fact, lower courts that have confronted questions of the constitutionality of
federal firearms regulation in the wake of Lopez have continued to find guidance in
pre-Lopez precedent. 6 Thus, lower courts have upheld federal statutes prohibiting
83 See Harold S. Herd, A Re-Examination of the Firearms Regulation Debate and Its
Consequences, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 196, 227 (1997); see also, e.g., Randy E. Barnett,
Foreword: Guns, Militias, and Oklahoma City, 62 TENN. L. REV. 443, 449 (1995) (arguing
that the Lopez decision, at a minimum, makes it more difficult for those who favor a broad
commerce power to dismiss arguments against the constitutionality of such powers); Nelson
Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual's Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REV. 1, 40 n.96
(1996) (noting that the Fifth Circuit's decision, United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1364
n.46 (5th Cir. 1993), suggests that "some applications of [the statute] might raise Second
Amendment concerns"); Gregory Lee Shelton, Comment, In Search of the Lost Amendment:
Challenging Federal Firearms Regulation Through the "States' Right" Interpretation of the
Second Amendment, 23 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 105, 106 n.l, 123 n. 114 (1995) (noting that the
Lopez decision "casts doubt on the constitutionality of federal regulation of the mere
possession of firearms").
"' See Herd, supra note 83, at 225; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
[T]he [Supreme] Court as an institution and the legal system as a whole have an
immense stake in the stability of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it has
evolved to this point. Stare decisis operates with great force in counselling us not
to call in question the essential principles now in place respecting the
congressional power to regulate transactions of a commercial nature.
Id. at 574.
"s See Amy Marie Pepke, Note, The Brady Bill: Surviving the Tenth Amendment, 48
VAND. L. REV. 1803, 1804 n.4 (1995).
86 See Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977); Barrett v. United States, 423
U.S. 212 (1976); United States v. Glover, No. 94-3131, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15113 (10th
Cir. June 19, 1995) (reversing a conviction under the Gun-Free School Zones Act in
conformity with Lopez); United States v. Walker, 59 F.3d 1196 (11 th Cir. 1995) (finding a
defendant's conviction under the Gun-Free School Zones Act to be plain error); United States
v. Ornelas, No. 94-1134, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 19574 (10th Cir. June 2, 1995) (reversing
a conviction under the Act); United States v. Edwards, 55 F.3d 428 (9th Cir. 1995) (reversing
a conviction under the Act); United States v. Murphy, 53 F.3d 93 (5th Cir. 1995) (upholding
a district court order refusing to file criminal information charging a defendant with violating
the Act).
[Vol. 7:2
CAN CONGRESS REGULATE FIREARMS?
the possession of guns by convicted felons 7 and the possession and transfer of
machine guns88 against challenges to Congress' power to enact them under the
Commerce Clause.89 By its broad interpretation of the jurisdictional element made
in Scarborough v. United States'° and Barrett v. United States,9 the Supreme Court
has implied that Congress has the power to legislate in the comprehensive manner
that the felon and machinegun bans suggest.92 In his Lopez concurrence,93 Justice
Kennedy emphasized stare decisis to prevent the Court from pushing Lopez far
enough to undo well-settled-and, in these cases, highly popular-precedent.94 The
holding in Printz confirms the Court's adherence to stare decisis in the area of federal
firearms regulation.
87 See United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 568 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 2470 (1997) ("Thus, all ten courts of appeals that have considered the constitutionality
of [the statute prohibiting firearms by felons] since Lopez have upheld the statute.").
88 See United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding the federal
machine gun ban in the wake of Lopez on the basis that Congress' prohibition of possession
was to "control [firearms'] interstate movement").
89 With respect to the federal ban on possession of firearms by felons, one scholar has
noted that, of all the statutes considered by lower courts in the wake of Lopez, this one "cuts
closest to the constitutional line." Merritt, supra note 71, at 717. In both Scarborough v.
United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1997), and Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212 (1976), the
Supreme Court upheld the ban for felons even though such possession is non-commercial in
character, the guns in question may be used lawfully in other contexts, and only a tenuous
relationship to interstate commerce may be shown to satisfy the jurisdictional nexus
emphasized in Lopez. Whether the Court would have decided Scarborough and Barrett
similarly had it heard them after Lopez is an intriguing question. Given the emphasis Justice
Kennedy placed on stare decisis in his concurring opinion, however, it appears likely that the
federal ban on gun possession by felons-as well as the general ban on machine guns-will
stand.
90 431 U.S. 563 (1977).
91 423 U.S. 212 (1976).
92 See Merritt, supra note 71, at 717-18. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, which upheld the machine
gun ban, is the most significant lower federal court decision to be issued since Lopez, which
considers the scope of the Commerce Clause with regard to federal firearms regulation. See
Herd, supra note 83, at 226-27. The key distinction between Wilks and Lopez is that the
firearm in Lopez generally was not outlawed under Congress' authority to regulate the instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce, whereas machine guns are so banned. See Wilks, 58 F.3d
at 1520-21. The Court in Wilks specifically noted that it did not consider the Second
Amendment issue because it was not raised by the parties. Id at 1519 n.2.
9 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574.
9 See Merritt, supra note 71, at 717-18.
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B. Printz v. United States: Holding the Lopez Line
As Justice O'Connor noted in her concurrence, the Court in Printz flatly declined
to restrict Congress from regulating firearms through its Commerce Clause power.95
Justice O'Connor emphasized that only the interim provisions of the Brady Act were
unconstitutional and that the remainder of the Act passed constitutional muster.96
Only Justice Thomas suggested that firearms deserved separate consideration under
the Commerce Clause--apart from his Second Amendment concerns-and that such
separate consideration might restrict Congress' ability to regulate them.97
The majority in Printz, however, focused exclusively on the constitutional
strictures forbidding Congress to issue mandates to state officers.98 The fact that the
underlying statute giving rise to the case dealt with firearms was incidental; 99 even
more so, perhaps, than was the statute in question in Lopez. The holding in Printz,
therefore, has even less of a direct impact on Congress' authority to regulate firearms
than did that in Lopez, except that in attempting to regulate intrastate firearm use
under the "substantial effects" prong of Lopez, Congress either must rely upon
federal law enforcement officers to enforce its regulations, or else it must make
contractual provisions with the states for their respective law enforcement officers to
enforce federal laws.l1°
Perhaps more noteworthy in Printz is what the Court chose not to say regarding
federal regulation of firearms under the commerce power. Lower court decisions
following Lopez-such as United States v. Wilks,' 0 -have raised certain important
questions regarding the application ofLopez's principles to federal statutes regulating
firearms. In Wilks, for example, the court upheld the federal statute banning
possession of machine guns on the basis that Congress' prohibition of mere
possession of such weapons prevented their shipment- across state lines ' 2 -an
undeniably shaky rationale. None of the justices, however, not even Justice Thomas,
have mentioned the lower court's application of Lopez's principles to firearms
regulation since 1995. The Court's silence does not amount to an adoption of the
reasoning of the Wilks decision; but neither should it encourage advocates of gun
9' See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2385 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
96 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2385 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Our holding... does not
spell the end of the objectives of the Brady Act.").
9' See id. at 2385-86 (Thomas, J., concurring).
98 See id. at 2368-85 (Scalia, J.).
99 See id at 2376-77, 2378-83.
10 See id. at 2385 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
... 58 F.3d 1518 (10th Cir. 1995).
102 See id.
[Vol. 7:2
CAN CONGRESS REGULATE FIREARMS?
proliferation and deregulation who have beheld wistfully in Lopez the morning star
of a new jurisprudential dawn in federal firearms regulation." 3
The holding in Printz thus appears to have kept to the straight-and-narrow stare
decisis path that Justice Kennedy propounded in his concurrence in Lopez,'14 and
allowed established precedent to stand insofar as possible within the bounds set by
Lopez. These decisions did not cast the net of judicial review any farther than the
facts of each case demanded. Indeed, the Court now may be eager to return to the
somnambulance in its Commerce Clause jurisprudence-now under the Lopez
paradigm-that it has cultivated for so long with regard to the Second Amendment.
The Court's long silence on the latter, however, has prompted a growing din in legal
commentary which Printz almost surely will whip into a fresh frenzy.
III. THE SECOND AMENDMENT
If the Printz holding meets with the same discussion and analysis that Lopez has
met,0 5 the simple fact that Printz addressed a federal statute regulating firearms will
guarantee that it becomes a cause cildbre for opponents of federal gun control. Just
as a few commentators have attempted to manipulate Lopez to support the claim that
the Second Amendment provides-or should be deemed to provide-for an
individual right to bear arms, 1'6 Printz is being invoked already as the harbinger of
a new, pro-gun Second Amendment jurisprudence by the Supreme Court.0 7 Not
103 Admittedly, the Printz holding specifically dealt with the issue presented to the Court
by the litigants: the constitutionality of the provisions of the Brady Act that required local
CLEOs to enforce federal laws. If any of the justices were concerned with the application of
Lopez by lower courts in firearms regulation cases, however, one might expect some dicta
to that effect in the opinion. Justice Thomas saw fit to grind his Second Amendment axe in
his concurrence and vaguely questioned whether Congress' commerce authority could apply
with full force to firearms. Yet, he never voiced any concern over lower courts' application
of Lopez; nor did he issue a clarion call for the Court to review its Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence vis-a-vis firearms as he did with regard to the Second Amendment. See Printz,
117 S. Ct. at 2385-86 (Thomas, J., concurring).
'o See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 574-75 (1975) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
105 See supra note 83 (citing articles by individual rights theorists claiming that Lopez
supports the idea that every individual has a right to bear arms).
106 See id.
107 The tide of scholarly rhetoric over the Second Amendment ramifications of Printz
already has begun approaching flood stage. See, e.g., Frank Espohl, The Right to Carry
Concealed Weapons for Self-Defense, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 151, 161 (1997) (citing Justice
Thomas's concurring opinion in Printz as suggestive of a desire by the Court to recast its
Second Amendment jurisprudence); David Harmer, Securing a Free State: Why the Second
Amendment Matters, 1998 BYU L. REv. 55, 98-99 (making much of Justice Thomas's
comment in his Printz concurrence that the Court in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174
(1939), never defined the substantive right guaranteed by the Second Amendment and that
no other case ever has defined this right ostensibly); David E. Johnson, Note, Taking a
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only does Printz fail to address the Second Amendment question--even though
Justice Thomas makes clear in his concurrence that he believes it should-it goes
some way toward affirming the jurisprudence of the lower federal courts that has
developed over the nearly sixty years since the Supreme Court's last pronouncement
on the Second Amendment.' This consistently held and developed jurisprudence
stands contrary to the policy goals of the "gun lobby." Thus, a proper understanding
of Printz should prevent the case from becoming yet another rallying point for those
who advocate increasing the proliferation of firearms under the auspices of the
Second Amendment.
A. The Debate Over the Meaning of the Second Amendment
Although the Second Amendment contains only twenty-seven words, it arguably
is one of the most ambiguous and least understood provisions in the entire
Constitution.0 9 The Amendment's very purpose has become the subject of intense
debate among jurists, historians, and the general public."0  This debate has
Second Look at the Second Amendment and Modern Gun Control Laws, 86 Ky. L.J. 197,
199 & n. 10, 216 (1998) (citing Printz generally in support of the individual rights view);
Nicholas J. Johnson, Principles and Passions: The Intersection ofAbortion and Gun Rights,
50 RUTGERS L. REv. 97, 128 & n. 141 (1997) (citing Printz to argue against the states' rights
view); David B. Kopel & Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Federalism Seriously: Lopez and the
Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, 30 CONN. L. REV. 59, 85-86 & n. 109 (1997) (citing Justice
Thomas's Printponcurrence to suggest that the time may be ripe for a plaintiff to press the
"individual rights" interpretation upon the Court); Sanford Levinson, Is the Second
Amendment Finally Becoming Recognized as Part of the Constitution? Voices from the
Courts, 1998 BYU L. REV. 127, 130-32 (citing Printz as a sign that the Court may be on the
verge of reconsidering its Second Amendment jurisprudence). See also the critique of the
"insurrectionist" wing of gun deregulation partisans offered by Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden
History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 309, 318-21 (1998) (noting that
Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in Printz may provide evidence that "insurrectionist"
gun deregulation partisans are succeeding in winning at least some support on the Court).
"' See Miller, 307 U.S. 174; see also infra notes 149-62 and accompanying text
(discussing Printz in the context of the Second Amendment debate).
09 The Second Amendment reads: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
"' Scholarly opinion of the clarity or ambiguity of this Amendment appears to be split
sharply along the divide between gun control advocates and proponents of gun proliferation.
See, e.g., Herd, supra note 83, at 208 ("[The Second Amendment] is generally considered
by scholars to be one of the most ambiguous provisions in the Constitution." (citing Kevin
D. Szczepanski, Searching for the Plain Meaning of the Second Amendment, 44 BUFF. L.
REv. 197 (1996), who concludes that, at most, the Amendment gives only a selective right
to bear arms, not an unrestricted one)); cf Lund, supra note 83, at 1 ("The Second
Amendment... is among the most well drafted provisions of the Bill of Rights.").
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concentrated on two contrasting views of the Second Amendment's meaning: the
"states' rights" view and the "individual rights" view.
Although this Note will explore the contours of these views further, the
respective interpretations of the Second Amendment are relatively straightforward.
The states' rights view, which the federal judiciary has upheld consistently, claims
that the Second Amendment protects the right of the individual states to maintain
their respective state militias without interference from the federal government,
especially from the federal government's disarmament of the citizens of a state."'
The individual rights view interprets the Second Amendment as guaranteeing a
virtually absolute right for all citizens to possess firearms for any purpose, whether
hunting, self-defense, antique collection, target shooting, or preparation for the armed
overthrow of the government."' According to this view, the federal government is
prohibited absolutely from preventing citizens' possession of firearms. Many of its
adherents argue vociferously that the Supreme Court soon should hold that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second
Amendment against state governments." 3 The states' rights and individual rights
views roughly define the two distinct factions into which this debate has devolved.
B. Judicial Construction of the Second Amendment
Notwithstanding Nelson Lund's view that the meaning of the Second
Amendment is clear and unambiguous," 4 the intensity of debate over its
interpretation provides ample demonstration of the ambiguity of the Amendment's
wording. Attempts at determining its plain meaning and the Framers' original intent
have become quite sophisticated and involved, and will not be explored here.' Of
principal importance is the fact that the Supreme Court," 6 and the lower federal
courts in its wake,' consistently have adhered to the states' rights view, and have
II See Herd, supra note 83, at 224. The states' rights view frequently is referred to in
scholarly literature as the "collectivist" view. This Note will not use that term so as to avoid
confusion with another related interpretation of the Second Amendment which holds that the
right provided by the Amendment inheres in the "people" defined most broadly, but does not
guarantee a right to bear arms to any particular individual. Few scholars support this
collectivist view and this Note will give it no further consideration.
12 See, e.g., Donald B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the
Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204, 268 n.12 (1983).
"' See Lund, supra note 83, at 52-53.
11l4 See id at 1.
"' See Herd, supra note 83, at 208-09; see also Lund, supra note 84, at 20 (discussing
plain meaning analysis of the Second Amendment); Herd, supra note 83, at 211-14
(discussing original intent analysis of the Second Amendment).
116 See infra notes 118-42 and accompanying text.
117 See infra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
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interpreted the Second Amendment as preserving a right on the part of the states to
regulate their respective militias free from federal interference.
The Supreme Court first began to address the Second Amendment in earnest in
the late nineteenth century. The first case in which the Court dealt squarely with the
Amendment was United States v. Cruikshank,"8 which originated as a federal
prosecution of a group of white bigots who conspired to prevent two black men from
enjoying their right of peaceful assembly."9 In Cruikshank, the Court held that the
Second Amendment restricted only the federal government, not the states, and that
the Constitution neither guaranteed a right to bear arms nor denied such a right.'2
The right to bear arms was, in effect, a matter strictly within the general police power
of the states.'
2
'
The Court carried its reasoning further in Presser v. Illinois, 22 a case arising
from a challenge from a group of German nationalists residing in Illinois to a state
statute prohibiting armed military drill except by units duly authorized by the
governor.'23 The Court followed Cruikshank in holding that the Second Amendment
did not guarantee to any individual the right to bear arms, nor was there any right for
companies of men not in the officially organized state militia to form up and drill.'24
The Court reapplied this decision in Miller v. Texas,'25 and upheld it, in dictum, in
Maxwell v. Dow.'26
The Court's next occasion to consider the Second Amendment was also its last,
at least insofar as it issued a serious pronouncement concerning the ostensible "right
to arms." This case was United States v. Miller,'27 which, like the Second
Amendment itself, was far from a model of clarity. Nevertheless, this sixty-year-old
118 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
"9 See id. at 548.
12o See id. at 553.
121 See id. The Court's states' rights reasoning was succinct:
The right... of "bearing arms for a lawful purpose"... is not a right granted by
the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for
its existence. The second amendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but
this ... means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress. This is
one of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the
national government, leaving the people to look for their protection against any
violation... of the rights it recognizes, to what [has been] called. . ."internal
police," "not surrendered or restrained" by the Constitution of the United States.
Id. (citations omitted).
122 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
123 See id at 253.
124 See id. at 265-68.
125 153 U.S. 535 (1894) (applying Cruikshank and Presser in upholding a Texas gun
control statute).
126 176 U.S. 581, 597 (1900) (citing with approval Presser).
127 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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case established the federal judiciary's modem Second Amendment jurisprudence
and remains the only Supreme Court decision of the twentieth century to deal directly
with the Second Amendment.
The facts of Miller concerned a challenge to the National Firearms Act of 193428
by a man caught transporting a sawed-off shotgun across state lines, an act prohibited
under the statute. 29 In answering Miller's claim that the Second Amendment
protected his possession of the shotgun and its transportation across state lines, the
Court held that the Amendment's effect was not to guarantee any personal, individual
right to possess a firearm. It acted, rather, to provide a base of armed men to embody
the "militia"'30 that Congress was authorized by the Constitution to summon with the
cooperation of the states.13' Of particular note in the Miller decision was the Court's
focus on the nature of the weapon itself in making its assessment of whether the
Second Amendment would provide a right to possess it. The Court stated that "[i]n
the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a [sawed-off
shotgun] ... has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well-regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the
right to keep and bear such an instrument."'3 1 One possible interpretation of the
128 See id. at 174-75; 28 U.S.C. §§ 5801-72 (1994).
129 See Miller, 307 U.S. at 174-75.
130 A considerable area of debate over the original intent behind the Second Amendment
concerns the meaning of militia. It appears that consensus as to the proper modem meaning
of the Amendment is vexed by the evolution and redefinition of the word militia in the
eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. See Sayoko Blodgett-Ford, The Changing
Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 103 (1995); Chuck
Dougherty, Note, The Minutemen, the National Guard, and the Private Militia Movement:
Will the Real Militia Please Stand Up?, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 959 (1995). A dictionary
from the nineteenth century gives the following definition of "militia":
The body of soldiers in a state enrolled for discipline, but not engaged in actual
service except in emergencies; as distinguished from regular troops, whose sole
occupation is war or military service. The militia of a country are the able
bodied men organized into companies, regiments, and brigades, with officers of
all grades and required by law to attend military exercises on certain days
only ....
2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New York, S.
Converse 1828), quoted in Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness
and Dereliction of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57 (1995); The OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY gives two slightly distinct definitions of militia as operative in British
North America in the latter half of the eighteenth century: (1) "the distinctive name of a
branch of the... military service, forming, together with the volunteers, what [were] known
as the 'auxiliary forces'; (2) "[tjhe whole body of men declared by law amenable to military
service, without enlistment, whether armed and drilled or not." 9 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 768 (2d ed. 1991).
... See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 14, 15.
132 Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
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Court's holding thus was that as long as the defendant proffered evidence showing
that the weapon in question was viable equipment for a militiaman, the Second
Amendment preserved a right to its possession. This interpretation, however, was
rejected in the very first appellate decision after Miller to treat the Second
Amendment and it has never met with favor in the courts. 133
Only three decisions since Miller have touched upon the Second Amendment to
any degree, and none directly. In Adams v. Williams,'34 Justice Douglas mentioned,
in dictum, that in Miller the Court had held explicitly that the Second Amendment
protected a right inhering in the states. 35  Nothing in the majority opinion
contradicted this statement or addressed the Second Amendment at all. Eight years
later in Lewis v. United States, 36 the Court reaffirmed that certain federal firearms
regulations do not violate the Second Amendment.'37 Finally, in United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez,' Chief Justice Rehnquist stated tentatively-in dictum about
which gun advocates have made much ado-that the Second Amendment might
provide an individual right. 39 The Court's use of the term "the people" in Verdugo-
Urquidez, however "does not even begin to address the central question of the
Second Amendment's scope: whether the right to bear arms applies to 'the people'
for all purposes, or only in connection with militia service."' 40 Recent claims that
131 See Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770
(1943). As one scholar has noted recently:
"[When] a written constitution has been judicially construed, such construction,
accepted and acquiesced in for many years, is as much a part of the instrument
as if it had been written into it at its origin." Thus, the Second Amendment does
not prevent Congress... from regulating individual ownership of firearms. It
does not recognize or grant an individual right to bear arms.
Herd, supra note 84, at 224-25 (quoting 16 C.J.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 33 (1984)).
134 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
'31 See id at 151 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Critics say that proposals [like that advocated
in Miller holding that the Second Amendment serves only to protect State militias] water
down the Second Amendment. Our decisions belie that argument, for the Second
Amendment... was designed to keep alive the militia.").
136 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
.137 Id. at 65 n.8.
138 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
"9 See id. at 265. The Chief Justice was discussing the meaning of the term "the people"
as understood in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and he drew on the use of that term in
other Amendments to elucidate its meaning. He wrote, "The Second Amendment protects
'the right of the people to keep and bear arms,"' and that the Tenth Amendment reserves
certain rights to "the people," but admitted that "this textual exegesis is by no means
conclusive." Id.
140 See Herz, supra note 130, at 73 n.56.
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Verdugo- Urquidez represents a new, pro-gun turn in the Court'sjurisprudence 14' thus
amount to little more than "sound and fury, signifying nothing."'
' 42
In the wake of Miller, lower federal courts have adhered to and further developed
the states' rights jurisprudence that the Supreme Court began to fashion with
Cruikshank. The foremost of these lower court decisions is Cases v. United States.
143
Cases was decided just three years after Miller, and was the first application by an
appellate court of the Miller holding to a different set of factual circumstances. The
First Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that an overly literal application of Miller's
focus upon the characteristics of the firearm under consideration would allow private
citizens to own such heavy military ordnance-as machine guns, tanks, or anti-aircraft
guns.1" The Cases court responded with a slight adaptation of the Miller holding: not
only must the weapon in question have a military application, but its possessor's use
of the weapon must bear a reasonable relationship to militia purposes.'45 This
explication of Miller thus limited Second Amendment defenses to federal firearms
violations by persons in "'military organizations' whose use or possession of a
firearm furthers a state's militia purposes. "146
In Cases, the Court established a tripartite analysis for cases involving such
Second Amendment defenses. As the federal courts have interpreted Cases, such
claims require consideration of (1) whether the party claiming the Second
Amendment defense has standing to assert Second Amendment rights, that is,
whether that party is in a military organization or his possession of the firearm is
reasonably related to state militia purposes; (2) what rights, if any, the state in issue
has conferred upon the party asserting Second Amendment protection; and (3)
whether the Second Amendment protects possession of the type of firearm in
question."' This interpretation of Cases in the federal judiciary in effect has become
the interpretation of Miller, the First Circuit's explication of Miller having been
regarded as authoritative virtually since the Cases decision first appeared. 4
141 See, e.g., Shelton, supra note 83, at 124 (citing U.S. v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 997 (1993)). In Hale, the defendant argued that the Verdugo-
Urguidez Court classified the Second Amendment as an individual right and, thus, allowed
him to possess a machine gun. Shelton notes that "the Hale Court dismissed the Verdugo-
Urguidez language as dicta." Shelton, supra note 83, at 124 n. 119.
142 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH, act 5, sc. 5.
143 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943).
... See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (holding that the federal
government could not prohibit the possession or use of any weapon with any reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia).
141 See Cases, 131 F.2d at 922-23; see also Shelton, supra note 84 at 119 (discussing the
court's adaptation, in Cases, of the Miller holding).
146 Shelton, supra note 83, at 119.
147 See id. at 129.
141 Other important lower court decisions which have followed Miller and Cases include
United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1942) (holding that because the defendant's
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The federal judiciary's extremely consistent construction of the Second
Amendment thus traces its roots back more than a century, with the Supreme Court
and circuit courts invariably holding that the Second Amendment guarantees a right
to the states, not to individuals. It is within the context of this longstanding federal
jurisprudence that one must consider Printz.
C. Printz in the Context of the Second Amendment Debate
Insofar as the Printz holding raised Second Amendment considerations, it did so
as a result of Justice Thomas's concurrence 49 and due to the nature of the federal
statute addressed in the case. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas mounted a plea for
the Court to take up the issue of whether the Second Amendment guarantees an
individual the right to bear arms, 50 a plea especially notable for the stony silence with
which it was met in Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority. 5' Taken in conjunction
with Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion-which emphasized that, except for its
interim provisions requiring local officials to enforce federal law, the Brady Act
remains fully in force' 52-and with the dissenting opinions of Justices Stevens153 and
Souter,'54 Printz amounted to a tacit endorsement of the federal judiciary's
longstanding construction of the Second Amendment. Far from being the next nail
in the coffin of more than a century of federal jurisprudence on the Second
Amendment, Printz demonstrated that the Court saw no reason to bring into question
possession of a pistol did not have a reasonable relationship to a militia, the defendant could
not invoke Second Amendment protection); United States v. Warrin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976) (agreeing with the court in Cases that Miller did
not lay down a general rule concerning the right to bear arms, and rejecting a Second
Amendment defense claimed by a member of a private citizen militia); United States v. Hale,
978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 997 (1993) (rejecting a Second
Amendment defense because the defendant's possession of a submachine gun was not
reasonably related to a well regulated militia); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120 (4th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 813 (1995) (holding that the defendant "failed to show how her
possession of handgun would preserve or ensure... [the] militia, so as to support" a Second
Amendment defense); Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
276 (1996) (holding that the Second Amendment confers a right upon the states, not
individuals); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 13 F. Supp. 811, 821-22 (S.D. Ind. 1998)
(upholding legislation preventing a law enforcement official with a conviction for a violent
domestic misdemeanor from possessing a firearm on the basis that Congress has a compelling
interest in preventing such possession).
'4 See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2385 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring).
5 See id. at 2385-86 (Thomas, J., concurring).
151 See id. at 2365-84 (Scalia, J.).
52 See id. at 2385 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
13 Id. at 2386-2406 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer).
114 Id. at 2401-04 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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that which consistently has been held by the nation's most learned jurists to be the
proper constitutional understanding of the right to bear arms.
Indeed, the major effect of both Printz and Lopez has been to strengthen and
expand state prerogatives vis-a-vis the federal government. Both cases emphasized
rights "reserved to the states" under the Tenth Amendment and held that Congress'
Commerce Clause authority does not grant it carte blanche to invade areas of
governmental power that the Framers left under state control when they formulated
the Constitution's dual sovereignty principle.'55 Considering the clear holdings of
each case-that Congress cannot conscript state officers for the enforcement of
federal laws,'56 and that in order for Congress to regulate intrastate activity the
activity in question must substantially affect interstate commerce' 57 -Printz and
Lopez thus seem more in conformity with the established federal jurisprudence on the
Second Amendment, which holds it to preserve rights to the states. In light of the
recent trend in the Court's decisions to enhance state rights, it is questionable that the
Court would make a sharp break with a line ofjurisprudence that no federal appellate
court ever has questioned, particularly considering the emphasis placed upon stare
decisis by one of the two justices whose vote generally is looked upon as controlling
in close cases.' If the dissenting opinions in Printz and Lopez are any indication,
the dissenting justices, the same four in each case,159 will be unlikely to support any
such shift in the Court's Second Amendment jurisprudence. Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Printz suggests that she also may be unwilling to support a change, 160
and Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Lopez may offer a similar indication of his
view.' 6' At least five, and perhaps six, justices thus appear unwilling to adopt the
view that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual the right to bear arms.
Of the remaining three justices on the Court, only Justice Thomas clearly has
indicated his preference for the individual rights interpretation. 62 The failure of any
justice, particularly Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist, to join in Justice
Thomas's dissent strongly suggests that the long-established construction of the
Second Amendment has nothing to fear from Printz.
J See id. at 2379; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
156 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2384.
'5 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
158 See id. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
9 Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens dissented in both Printz and Lopez.
160 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2385 (noting that the holding focuses on Tenth Amendment
issues and does not "spell the end of the objectives of the Brady Act").
161 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568-83 (focusing on the Federal intrusion of state sovereignty,
while failing to address an individual right to bear arms).
162 See id at 2386.
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D. The Need for a Modern Statement on the Meaning of the Second Amendment
The hollowness of gun advocates' claims of a major break in the Supreme
Court's view of the Second Amendment evidenced by Lopez notwithstanding, the
fact that so many learned jurists and scholars engage almost monthly in sophisticated
guesswork over the meaning-not just the specific meaning, but the general
meaning---of one of the primary freedoms guaranteed in the Bill of Rights illustrates
the dire need for the Supreme Court to make a modern ruling on the scope and
meaning of the Second Amendment. Justice Thomas effectively issued a call for the
Court to do just that.'63 The Court should heed his call. The Court's most recent
pronouncement on the issue is sixty years old and is one of the Court's more opaque
explications of a Constitutional right. Thus it seems high time for the Court to make
a clear statement as to "what the law is," in the words of Chief Justice John
Marshall. 6" Opportunities to do just that have arisen indeed, but the Court thus far
has not granted review in such cases.165 Already at least one federal district court has
admitted to some confusion when it sought to apply the Supreme Court's Second
Amendment jurisprudence in the wake of Printz.166 The Court should and, indeed,
must clarify the meaning of the Second Amendment in the near future, lest the nation
enter the twenty-first century in a state of utmost confusion over one of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Only the Supreme Court can
begin to quiet the increasingly shrill din of this debate. 1
67
The Court should issue a clear statement, as soon as an appropriate case arises
for review, reaffirming that the Second Amendment guarantees a right to the states,
not to individuals, and, as such, that the Court's longstanding jurisprudence treating
the Second Amendment holds firm under the umbrella of stare decisis. Although gun
163 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2386.
'6" Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
161 Of particular note was Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983), which upheld a local ordinance banning handguns.
At the time, many opponents of gun regulation touted Quilici as providing a long-overdue
opportunity for the Supreme Court to establish that the Second Amendment provides an
absolute right for individuals to bear arms. The Court's denial of review in that case has left
the question open, especially in light of the recent flood of law review articles and treatises
seeking to undermine the long-held construction of the Second Amendment. See supra note
108 (citing supporters of the individual rights view and their reactions to the Printz decision).
166 See Doe v. Bureau ofAlcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, No. 3:94CV 1699 JBA, 1997
WL 852086 (D. Conn. Sept. 12, 1997) at * 5, * 17 (reciting federal case law construing the
Second Amendment, but noting that following Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in Printz
there may be some doubt as to the law in this area).
167 See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 150-51 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("A
powerful lobby dins into the ears of our citizenry that [bearing arms is a] constitutional
right[] ... protected by the Second Amendment.... Our decisions belie that argument, for
the Second Amendment was designed to keep alive the militia.").
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control opponents have come to believe lately that historical scholarship relevant to
the origins of the Second Amendment lies wholly on their side,'68 the Court should
recognize that this area of debate is by no means so one-sided.16 9 Even if the weight
of historical scholarship---when "weight" is measured in reams of paper rather than
in terms of persuasive force-favors critics of federal firearms jurisprudence, the
equally persuasive historical arguments supporting that jurisprudence, coupled with
the doctrine of stare decisis and the Court's complementary Tenth Amendment/
Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it bears upon firearms, dictate that the Court
clarify, once and for all, that the Second Amendment does not guarantee any
individual right to bear firearms. Both the federal and state governments, therefore,
have broad power to regulate the transfer and possession of such weapons. The
holding in Printz supports that proposition even more clearly than did the holding
in Lopez. The Court now only need sketch in the gray areas left by these recent
Tenth Amendment decisions touching upon firearms regulation. By linking this
recently developed doctrine with its well-established Second Amendment doctrine,
the Court can clarify that Congress does have authority under the Commerce Clause
to regulate firearms in commerce, and that the states are vested with an even broader
authority to regulate firearms generally.
IV. CONCLUSION
Opponents of federal gun control will herald the Supreme Court's decision in
Printz to strike down certain provisions of the Brady Act as increasing evidence that
the Court inevitably will declare Congress, and perhaps even the states themselves, 70
unable to regulate most kinds of commonly available firearms. Careful examination
of the case in the context both of the Court's developing Tenth Amendment/
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and of its longstanding Second Amendment
jurisprudence, however, demonstrates that both Printz and Lopez uphold Congress'
continuing ability to iegulate virtually all firearms under the commerce power. As
established in Lopez, Congress may regulate firearms as instrumentalities of interstate
commerce; 17 or, upon satisfying the various factors of analysis required to show a
substantial effect upon interstate commerce, Congress also may regulate intrastate
firearms transactions." While Printz prevents Congress from co-opting state officers
68 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2386 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(citing a veritable laundry-list of pro-gun historiography).
169 See, e.g., Bogus, supra note107; Herd, supra note 83, at 206 (examining the Second
Amendment under several different methods of Constitutional analysis); Herz, supra note
130, at 63-67 (criticizing the "broad view" of the Second Amendment by the "gun lobby").
170 See Lund, supra note 83, at 52-53.
'7' See Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
172 See id.
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for the enforcement of federal laws, it makes evident that Congressional authority to
regulate firearms is unquestionable.'73 If one pays careftl attention to what the nine
justices said (and, significantly, to what they did not say) in both opinions, it also
becomes evident that the Court likely will not overturn the settled federal
jurisprudence on the Second Amendment, which holds that the Amendment
guarantees no individual right to keep and bear arms.
Such a course is appropriate. As Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lopez
expressed so well, stare decisis provides a crucial stability to our legal system.'74
Moreover, for over one hundred years the federal courts have adhered to the very
reasonable-and historically defensible-view that the Second Amendment protects
the rights of the states to regulate their own militias (however one may wish to define
that term). Such a lengthy body ofjudicial precedent itself has constitutional weight
and authority that merits considerable deference.'75 The Court, therefore, was
correct not to reach further in deciding Printz than to reject the interim provisions of
the Brady Act on the grounds cited. Justice O'Connor's emphasis, in her concurring
opinion, that the rest of Brady remains good law underscores the Court's
commendable adherence to the federal judiciary's long and entirely consistent
construction of the Second Amendment.'76 This construction has left the ultimate
authority to regulate firearms firmly where it belongs: within the general police
power of the states, supplemented by Congressional authority to regulate firearms as
articles of commerce.
The Court should, however, take the earliest possible opportunity to clarify this
long-standing interpretation of the Second Amendment. As the shrill character of the
debate over firearms regulation increasingly has made evident, the Court needs to
reaffirm clearly and forcefully the federal judiciary's longstanding construction of the
Second Amendment for a generation that has, in the words of one scholar, gone "gun
crazy."'
177
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171 See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (striking down the interim
provisions of the Brady Act, but leaving the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 921 et.
seq. (1994), intact).
171 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
171 See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 33 (1984).
176 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2385 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
177 Herz, supra note 130, at 57.
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